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It is commonly found that young people tend to adopt the political party choice of their
parents. However, far less is known about the applicability of this theory when investi-
gating radical right support. Using the Swiss Household panel data (1999e2007), this
study empirically identiﬁes the relationship between parents’ preference for the Swiss
radical right party SVP and their attitudes toward immigrants and the EU, and their
offspring’s preference for the SVP. Disaggregating fathers’ and mothers’ inﬂuence reveals
that in particular, mothers’ SVP support plays a role in SVP support among young people,
even after controlling for educational similarities. We also demonstrate that girls are more
likely to be inﬂuenced by their mothers than are boys. Furthermore, parents’ negative
attitudes toward the EU exert a positive inﬂuence on their children’s radical right voting,
independent of their voting pattern.
 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Since the 1980s, radical right wing parties have been
successful in various Western European countries. This
success has provoked the sociologically signiﬁcant question
of who votes for these parties, which has been mirrored by
a signiﬁcant increase in the number of scientiﬁc studies of
the extreme right’s electorate. Many theories and expla-
nations have been suggested for this phenomenon, yet
signiﬁcant gaps in understanding remain. A theory that has,
to the best of our knowledge, not been tested empirically inieke.voorpostel@fors.
atherine Bolzendahl,
comments. They also
This study has been
Switzerland” project,
hich is based at the
S, University of Lau-
l Science Foundation.
. All rights reserved.the radical right research is parental transmission. In his
recent work on the radical right in Europe, Mudde (2007:
217) notes that there is little doubt about the crucial
importance of the family in shaping political party afﬁlia-
tions, but at the same time, he recognises that not much is
known about the topic.
Our research seeks to ﬁll this void and investigate how
parental radical right voting and radical right attitudes are
related to the likelihood that a young person will support
the radical right. Therefore, our central research question
reads: To what extent do the parents’ radical right party
voting and radical right attitudes affect their children’s
radical right voting? In particular, we will focus on the
Swiss SVP.2 Even though discussions continue about the
deﬁnition of the family of radical right parties and debates
over whether the SVP can be classiﬁed as a radical right
party remain, the SVP is considered to belong to this party2 This party is formally known in German as the Schweizerische
Volkspartei (SVP) and in French as the Union Démocratique du Centre
(UDC).
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Kitschelt, 2005; Mudde, 2007; Oesch, 2008; Ivarsﬂaten,
2008). Clearly, as a member of government for several
decades the SVP’s position differs fundamentally from the
position of its counterparts in other political systems (Betz,
2001). However, with the change of its ideological proﬁle
since the nineties, it shares with other new radical right
parties a belief in a united and sovereign population and
a xenophobic rhetoric. Hence, a growing consensus has
emerged of considering the SVP as a radical right party.
Consequently, with our focus on the SVP, we believe to
contribute to the rich literature on the radical right, in
which radical right parties such as the Front National,
Vlaams Belang and the FPÖ have been studied extensively.
Yet the research on SVP is relatively limited in the inter-
national (English) literature e McGann and Kitschelt
(2005), Fontana et al. (2006) and Oesch (2008) being
notable exceptions e and it is often neglected in compar-
ative analyses on the radical right (e.g. Arzheimer and
Carter, 2006; Bale, 2003; Givens, 2004; Ignazi, 2003),
despite it being one of the most successful radical right
parties in Western Europe.
Another contribution of our paper to the research on the
radical right is its focus on young people. Indeed, the ques-
tion as to why young people are likely to vote for the radical
right is underdeveloped at best. Yet, this is particularly
relevant given that research has revealed that radical right
parties on the whole do well among young people and ﬁrst
time voters (Lubbers et al., 2002; Mudde, 2007).3
Besides further developing our knowledge about radical
right parties and their success, and bringing socialisation
theories into the research on the radical right, an additional
aim of our paper is to further test the theory of parental
transmission or, more generally, socialisation theory. Like
any well-established research tradition in the social
sciences, this theory requires frequent testing. Critical
analysis of political socialisation theories is particularly
important as times change and the fortunes of various
political parties shift dramatically at the macro level.
Indeed, socialisation theories have generally been tested in
stable political environments and for mainstream parties
(Sapiro, 2004). Besides, as Sapiro (2004) notes in her review
of recent research on political socialisation, the topic has
mostly interested American scholars. Using the Swiss
Household Panel data (1999e2007), our study will put
socialisation theories to the test outside the USA using
a political outsider that has recently experienced growing
success, progressing from garnering 11.9 per cent support
in the 1991 national elections to an election-winning 29 per
cent in 2007.
We further plan to develop previous insights on family
and party choice in three important ways. First, we inves-
tigate both the inﬂuence of the parents’ radical right party
choice and related attitudes on their offspring’s radical right
party choice and test whether it is the parents’ radical right3 As for the SVP, the Swiss Household panel data used in the present
paper reveal that young persons (age 18e25) are relatively more likely
than their parents (age 35e80) to support the SVP. (Results available
upon request).party choice or rather their related attitudes (such as
negativity toward immigrants and the EU) that lead
youngsters to vote for the radical right. In other words, we
will try to establish which mechanism is most important.
Second, we look at the mothers’ and fathers’ inﬂuences
separately, arguing that the two parents may play different
roles. Third, we investigate whether father’s or mother’s
SVP voting and radical right attitudes matter differently for
sons and daughters.
The paper proceeds as follows. We begin by reviewing
theoretical insights on family and party choice and by
presenting our hypotheses on the inﬂuence of parents on
their offspring’s radical right voting behaviour. The next
section introduces data and measurements. Our multivar-
iate analyses are presented in the third section. Finally, we
conclude with a discussion of our results and suggestions
for further research.
2. Theory and hypotheses
The role of family as a prime agent of socialisation has
occupied an important place in the literature on political
partisanship, showing that family, and mainly parents,
play a prominent role in a person’s political orientation
(Jennings, 2007: 38). In their groundbreaking research on
political socialisation, Jennings and Niemi (1968, 1974)
uncovered a high degree of partisan consistency
between parents and children. In more recent research,
Jennings et al. (2009) conﬁrm that parents are successful
in passing along their partisan orientations to their chil-
dren. It has been argued that like almost everyone else,
children “take the political cues of trusted loved ones with
whom they frequently interact” (Zuckerman et al., 2007:
93). Besides, as young persons enter the electorate, they
usually do not have a reason to reject their parents’
preferences.
However, the golden age of socialisation research was in
the late sixties and early seventies. It has mostly focused on
mainstream parties in relatively stable political environ-
ments and has been criticized for not being able to explain
processes of change (Greenstein, 1970; Sapiro, 2004; Wass,
2007). The critique is directed towards the research that
sees children as being more or less direct recipients or
inheritors of parental political traits (Beck and Jennings,
1991). In addition to the fact that children may observe
and copy their parents’ norms and behaviour, theymay also
be inﬂuenced by age-peers, age-graded institutions such as
the school and socio-historical events (Bengtson,1975). The
inﬂuence of such age-related factors, referred to as
“generation effects”, may result in the mergence of alter-
native attitudes and behaviour which may result in social
change. In other words, some changes in preferences may
originate from generational replacement due to the fact
that the young cohorts have adopted essentially different
values and patterns of behaviour compared to the previous
cohorts (Niemi and Sobieszek, 1977). This may particularly
be the case for newer parties in the political system which
may be more successful in attracting newer voters. For
example, considering the effect of age, research (e.g. Birch,
2009) revealed that young people were more likely to vote
for the greens than older citizens.
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and radical right voting, though several scholars argue that
radical right parties are supported disproportionally by
both the youngest and the oldest cohorts of the general
electorate (e.g. Van Craen and Swyngedouw, 2002;
Arzheimer and Carter, 2006). If younger citizens are over-
represented (though the same would hold for underrep-
resentation) within the electorate of a particular party, it
may indicate that they vote in a different way than their
parents’ generation. This idea is also related to the
dealignment literature which suggests that fewer young
citizens are beginning their voting experience with
a partisan attachment inherited from their parents
(Dalton, 2000).
Hence, it remains to be seen how strong the inﬂuence of
parents is with respect to radical right party preferences in
less stable political systems than those of some decades
ago. Swyngedouw (2001: 228) states in his research on the
Flemish Vlaams Blok (currently Vlaams Belang) voters that
socialisation motives are scarce among these voters and
less frequent than among voters of ‘old pillar parties’.
However, some scholars argue that radical rightists come
from radical right families. For example, Klandermans and
Mayer (2005) revealed that many activists of the populist
radical right groups were raised in such families. Yet, as
Mudde (2007: 218) notes, the voters may have a different
background than the activists. Then again, radical right
voters are considered to be loyal voters and true party
supporters (Mudde, 2007). Previous research has revealed
that the transmission of attitudes and partisanship is
stronger the more consistent and salient the partisanship is
(Jennings et al., 2009). Hence, we expect parental SVP
support to positively inﬂuence children’s SVP preference.
Traditionally, political socialisation scholars have tested
the hypothesis that parents and their children vote for the
same party by looking for similarities between the partisan
preferences of young people and their parents. They
presume that in one way or another, parents reveal their
voting preferences to their children (Beck and Jennings,
1991). However, research has shown that some parents
are uncommunicative about their political behaviour with
their children (Converse and Dupeux, 1962). Hence, it is
important to investigate an alternative besides the
straightforward relationship between parents’ and chil-
dren’s party choices. There may indeed be a more unin-
tentional form of political socialisation at stake via the
exposure of young people to the (political) views and
attitudes their parents express. As such, parents would be
the ‘transmitters’ of political views, which would conse-
quently inﬂuence young people’s party choices. This may
particularly be the case with respect to radical right voting,
which is strongly inﬂuenced by attitudes. Previous research
has indeed revealed how radical right attitudes, such as
anti-immigrant attitudes, inﬂuence radical right voting
(Coffé, 2005; Lubbers et al., 2002; Mudde, 2007). These are
salient political attitudes where parental cue-giving is
likely (Dalton, 1980). Hence, we expect negative parental
attitudes toward immigrants and the EU e two main
ideological dispositions of the SVP electorate (McGann and
Kitschelt, 2005) e to positively inﬂuence children’s SVP
party preference.Previous research on family socialisation has revealed
that not all parents are equally successful in transmitting
their party choices and attitudes. Jaspers et al. (2008) ﬁnd
that mothers are more successful in inﬂuencing their
children’s attitudes than fathers. Mayer and Schmidt
(2004) notice that the mother is the only reliable
predictor for political socialisation in Japan, which has
been explained by the higher frequency of interaction
between mothers and their children (Bao et al., 1999).
Work by Zuckerman et al. (2007) reveals that although
women tend to be viewed as less politically involved,
mothers stand at the centre of the household and matter
more than fathers with regard to their offspring’s parti-
sanship in Britain and Germany. Thus, we hypothesise that
mothers have a larger inﬂuence on their children’s SVP
party preference than fathers.
Differences across children also occur with regard to
parental inﬂuence. In particular, the forces of political
socialisation affect boys and girls differently. Trevor (1999:
66) notes that “men show more independence from
parental inﬂuence”, whereas women are more submissive
and obedient. As a result of these attitudes, daughters are
more likely to copy their parents’ attitudes and party
identiﬁcation. Hence, we hypothesise that the parental
inﬂuence on their offspring’s SVP choice will be larger for
daughters than for sons.
Moreover, as women tend to be more central in family
life (McGoldrick, 1991) and as daughters usually interact
more with their mothers than sons do (Bao et al., 1999), we
expect mothers’ SVP preferences and attitudes to matter
more for daughters’ than for sons’ SVP voting behaviour.
One dominant critique of socialisation studies is that the
positive correlations between parental and youth partisan
support are misinterpreted. Whereas proponents of the
socialisation hypotheses see intergenerational inﬂuence in
the similarity in voting behaviour between parents and
their offspring, others suggest that parents and their chil-
dren reason and behave independently. They argue that the
inﬂuence the family may have on political orientations is
foremost the result of the family’s providing the child with
a social identity and a location within the social structure,
which, in turn, affects political orientations (Glass et al.,
1986; Beck and Jennings, 1991). This argument has been
referred to as the spurious relationship hypothesis (Tedin,
1974: 1581). The inﬂuential factors in such analyses stem
from parents’ structural positions and include educational
attainment, which has been proven to be an important
predictor of radical right voting. Support for the radical
right has been shown to vary inversely with the level of
education (e.g. Billiet and de Witte, 2008; Lubbers and
Scheepers, 2001; Lubbers et al., 2002; Norris, 2005; Rink
et al., 2009), though some studies revealed a curvilinear
relationship, with the radical right receiving its strongest
support from the mid-school category (Arzheimer and
Carter, 2006; Evans, 2005; Rydgren, 2008). In any case, it
is consistently found that highly educated people are less
likely to vote for radical right parties. Thus, it is important
to take these variables into account if we want to be able to
estimate the socialising effects that actually stem from
parents’ radical right voting and anti-immigrant and -EU
attitudes.
7 Note that, as in most electoral studies, SVP voters are underrepre-
sented in the SHP survey. Indeed, over all observations (for the different
years taken together), of the people who expressed a preference for
a party, 18% voted in favor of the SVP. The electoral results of the party
were: 14.9% in 1995, 22.6% in 1999, 26.7% in 2003. The party gained 28.9
percent in the most recent elections of 2009.
8 Whereas dissatisfaction with democracy makes an important
contribution to the understanding of different radical right parties in
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The hypotheses presented above were tested using data
from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). The SHP is a yearly
panel study collecting data from all household members in
randomly selected households in Switzerland. Because the
Swiss Household Panel collects data from all household
members and includes several questions about political
attitudes, it is especially well suited for examining the inter-
generational transmission of voting behaviour.Most electoral
studies and studies on socialisation rely on family-level esti-
mates obtained fromyoung respondents, and no information
is available directly from the parents. In the present study,
however, we can rely on the parents’ own answers regarding
their political attitudes and voting behaviour.
The ﬁrst wave of the SHP dates back to 1999, when 5074
households were interviewed, yielding 7799 individual
interviews with household members. In 2004, 2538
households (3654 individuals) were added to replace
households that had been lost from the study. In 2007, the
sample consisted of 7457 individuals.4 To reach a large
enough number of observations to conduct the analysis, we
employed all available data, which included all waves
conducted from 1999 to 2007.
In each wave all respondents aged 18 to 25 who claimed
Swiss nationality and whose parents both responded, were
selected, yielding 2292 observations. The age span included
theﬁrst year an individualwas eligible to vote (the voting age
in Switzerland is 185). Only households with complete inter-
viewswith bothparents and at least one child in the right age
rangewereused,which constitutedonlya small subsampleof
the totaloriginal sample. Somerespondentswere siblingsand
sharedbothparents. Caseswithmanymissing values (n¼ 69)
on other key variables were excluded from the analysis,
leading to an analytical sampleof2223observations from919
youngsters and 580 pairs of parents. Of all respondents, 40.5
per cent were in the dataset only once, 36.7 per cent were
included twice or three times, 16.3 per cent had four or ﬁve
valid interviews and6.5 per centwere in the dataset six times
ormore,with amaximumof nine appearances in the dataset.
Of the respondents, 497 were men (54.1 per cent) and
422 were women (45.9 per cent). In 9.4 per cent of the
observations the father was not living in the household. For
the mothers this percentage was 9.6.
3.1. Dependent variable
To investigate political party preference, the respon-
dents were asked which party theywould vote for if federal
elections took place tomorrow. As we are interested in
radical right voting, we operationalised our dependent
variable as a dummy: it was equal to 1 for young persons
who would vote for the radical right party SVP if elections
would take place tomorrow and 0 otherwise.6 Of all4 For survey details, see www.swisspanel.ch.
5 Switzerland lowered its voting age from 20 to 18 in 1991 by national
referenda. In 2007 the canton of Glarus decided to lower the voting age to
16 for communal and cantonal elections.
6 Note that respondents claiming that they would not vote for a party or
would not participate in the elections are included in the reference category.observations, 12.1 per cent expressed the preference to vote
for the SVP, coming from 177 individuals. Of the young
people, 19.3 per cent expressed a preference for the SVP at
least once.3.2. Key explanatory variables
The ﬁrst main explanatory variable is the parents’
party preference for the SVP. The variable equals 1 for
parents who would vote for the SVP if there was an
election for the National Council tomorrow and 0 for
parents who would vote for another party than the SVP.
To test our hypothesis that mothers matter more as
socialising agents than fathers with regard to their
offspring’s radical right party choice, we distinguished
between the party choices of the father and the mother.
Overall, 10.7 per cent of the party preference responses
among fathers and 7.2 per cent among mothers were for
the SVP (r¼ .45). Hence, our data conﬁrm the previous
ﬁnding that women are less likely to vote for radical right
parties in general and SVP in particular than men (Givens,
2004; Norris, 2005).7
In addition to the parents’ party preference, we included
parents’ attitudes related to radical right voting, which
included father’s and mother’s anti-EU sentiments and
intolerance toward immigrants. Previous research has
revealed that these attitudes are linked to radical right
voting in general and SVP voting in particular (Coffé, 2005;
Ivarsﬂaten, 2008; Lubbers et al., 2002; Nicolet and Sciarini,
2006; Oesch, 2008; Skenderovic, 2007). This may be
related to the ideological discourse of the SVP, which is very
much focused on opposition to immigration and the
European Union.8 To measure negative attitudes toward
immigrants, respondents were asked whether they were in
favour of Switzerland offering the same opportunities to
Swiss citizens, in favour of Switzerland offering Swiss
citizens better opportunities, or neither. The variable was
recoded into a dummy, with the value of 1 referring to an
attitude in favour of offering Swiss citizens better oppor-
tunities and 0 otherwise. Our indicator of attitudes toward
the EU was a dummy taking the value of 1 when respon-
dents were ‘in favour of Switzerland staying outside of the
EU’ and 0 when respondents were ‘in favour of Switzerland
joining the EU’ or ‘neither’. An anti-EU sentiment wasWestern Europe, previous research revealed that it carries little weight
in the explanation of SVP voting (Ivarsﬂaten, 2008; Oesch, 2008). This
may be related to its status as a leading Swiss party which is represented
in government, in contrast to the status of an opposition parties as is the
case for most radical right party. Not withstanding previous ﬁndings, we
did test the inﬂuence of trust in federal government. In line with
previous ﬁndings, it was found that political trust in not signiﬁcantly
related to SVP voting. Hence we did not include the attitude in our
models.
9 To assess the strength and stability of our ﬁndings we also ran the
models using only one wave (2004, containing 472 observations). Results
from these analyses were comparable and are available upon request.
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this issue extensively in its campaigns, and research
suggests that they beneﬁtted electorally from this strategy
(McGann and Kitschelt, 2005; Ivarsﬂaten, 2006). Among
the mothers, in 27.3 per cent of the cases, a preference for
the Swiss having better opportunities than immigrants was
expressed. Among fathers, this value was 24.6 per cent
(r¼ .23). Regarding anti-EU sentiments, percentages for
mothers and fathers were 36.4 per cent and 43.3 per cent,
respectively (r¼ .51).
3.3. Control variables
To investigate whether the parents’ socialisation effects
on their children’s party support is the result of the
common household social position as suggested by the
spurious relationship hypothesis, we included in our
models a variable indicating the socioeconomic status of
the household. We introduced father’s and mother’s
educational attainment to measure the household’s status
in society. Time and again, research on radical right parties
has shown that high education is a strong buffer against
radical right voting (Lubbers et al., 2002; Norris, 2005). The
level of education of the father and mother was measured
in 11 categories, where 0 equals did not complete elementary
school and 10 equals university. The mean score for mothers
was 4.99 and for fathers 6.58, and the correlation between
the two was .47.
Since parents inﬂuence the status positions their chil-
dren achieve (De Graaf et al., 2000), it is also important to
control for the children’s status positions. For this reason,
we included educational level and occupational status of
the respondent. Educational level was operationalised in
the same way as for the parents (M¼ 3.84). In addition, we
included a dummy for whether the child was still enrolled
in school, which was the case in 65 per cent of the obser-
vations. This dummy reﬂects the institutional or social
integration of the children and controls for the fact that
young people’s educational level at school is obviously
inﬂuenced by the fact that they are still completing their
education. Occupational status was measured using the
EriksoneGoldhorpeePortocarero classiﬁcation (EGP),
which is based on employment status and occupation
(Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992). Because 33.8 per cent of
the youth did not yet have an occupation, the scale of
originally 11 categories was recoded into three dummy
variables where the group without occupation functioned
as the reference group. The low status group included semi-
and unskilled manual employees, farm labour and self-
employed farmers, the medium status group contained
self-employed with and without employees, manual
supervisors, skilled manual employees and routine non-
manual employees, and the high status group was made
up of higher controllers and low controllers.
We further control for different individual characteristics
that have been related to radical right voting behaviour in
previous research. Past research on the radical right has
found that non-religious people are overrepresented in the
radical right electorate (Billiet, 1995; Coffé, 2005). In addi-
tion, churchgoers are less likely to support the radical right.
Hence, we included a measure of the individual’s frequencyof church attendance in order to account for the effects of
religious organisational participation on radical right
support. Frequency of church attendance ranged from
0 (never) to 8 (several times a week). The mean score was
2.8. We made additional adjustments for the role of indi-
vidual characteristics through the inclusion of age (M¼ 20.8)
and gender (48 per cent female) as control variables. Gender
has been identiﬁed as a consistent predictor of radical right
voting, as male voters are over-represented among the
voters of the radical right parties, including the Swiss radical
right (Fontana et al., 2006; Givens, 2004; Gidengel et al.,
2005; Norris, 2005; Fontana et al., 2006).
We also introduced attitudinal characteristics of the
respondent: negative attitudes toward immigrants (exp-
ressed in 24 per cent of the observations) and toward the
EU (45 per cent). Both attitudes are coded similarly to the
parental attitudes as presented above.
Because wewere primarily interested in intra-household
factors, it was important to account for external forces. Given
that the SVP has a traditional base in German speaking areas,
we included the language of the interview. Two dummy
variables were included, one for French language (24 per
cent of the observations) and one for Italian (2.5 per cent of
the observations) to contrast against the German speaking
respondents (74 per cent of the observations).3.4. Analytical strategy
In the analyses below, we examine the effect of parental
SVP voting and radical right attitudes on young people’s
SVP voting behaviour. Since we use panel data, we have
multiple observations within persons who are nested
within parents and thus nonindependent observations,
making ordinary regressionmodels unsuitable. Rather than
losing information by using only one observation per
respondent and one child per parent, we chose to use all
observations available.9 To control for the clustered struc-
ture of the data, we apply a multilevel model with obser-
vations nested within individuals (Snijders and Bosker,
1999). Multilevel analysis models responses in different
waves within and between individuals by estimating
regression equations on both levels simultaneously.
Multilevel models therefore take account of the nested
structure of the data and use the right number of cases. Our
models distinguish between three levels: 580 Level 3
observations (parents), 918 Level 2 observations (individ-
uals) and 2221 Level 1 observations (observations for
different years within individuals). Because the dependent
variable is binary, we use a multilevel logistic model to
estimate the likelihood for young people to vote for the SVP
versus not to vote for the SVP. For interpretation purposes,
the age of the respondent and the educational attainment
of both the respondent and the parents were centred to
the mean.
Four models are presented. Model 1 includes the SVP
voting preference of the parents in addition to the control
10 Without the inclusion of the respondents’ attitudes, parents’ educa-
tional level is signiﬁcantly and negatively related to SVP voting. This effect
disappears after inclusion of attitudes.
H. Coffé, M. Voorpostel / Electoral Studies 29 (2010) 435e443440variables. Model 2 includes attitudes of the parents and the
control variables. The ﬁrst two regression models test,
respectively, the relevance of parental SVP voting and
parental radical right attitudes when explaining young
people’s SVP voting, controlling for demographic inﬂu-
ences. To further investigate the relevance of parental SVP
voting and attitudes when explaining youngsters’ SVP
voting, all variables are included in the third model. We
ﬁnally consider the potential that the effects of parental
SVP voting and parental attitudes matter differently for
sons and daughters and test the result of adding signiﬁcant
interaction effects in Model 4. Descriptive statistics for all
variables included in our analyses are provided in the
Appendix.
3.5. Methodological issues
Prior to presenting our estimation results, two related
and important methodological issues must be raised. First,
the explanation of young people’s preference for the radical
right by parental radical right voting behaviour and
attitudes may face problems of ‘reverse causality’. Indeed, it
is possible that parents are inﬂuenced by their offspring.
Hence, it is not always clear in what direction the ﬂow of
causality runs when interpreting the correlation between
parental radical right attitudes and voting behaviour and
young people’s radical right voting. While it is reasonable
to suspect that reciprocity may prevail and all members of
the household may inﬂuence one another, we believe that
the inﬂuence will primarily run from parents to their
children as most young people have less experience with
politics and usually have no a priori reason to reject their
parents’ party preference.
Second, some debate may arise over our measurement
of parental inﬂuence, namely at the same point in time for
both parents and youngsters. Indeed, the study of political
socialisation is widely regarded as the study of children
because people’s basic orientations to politics are estab-
lished during childhood (Sapiro, 2004: 13). However, as
Alford et al. (2005: 154) note, in contrast to early political
socialisation researchers, more contemporary researchers
have shown that recent circumstances and events can
change preferences. Hence, it seems reasonable to suspect
that parents may socialise their children toward a partic-
ular party preference through their current voting
behaviour.
4. Results
We now turn to the explanatory analyses to investigate
parental inﬂuence on SVP voting among young people.
The results of the multivariate analyses are presented in
Table 1.
Model 1 in Table 1 suggests that parental SVP support
matters for young people’s preference for the radical right
party. Model 1 in Table 1 shows that when parents choose
the SVP as their favoured party, the chance that their
offspring will also be inclined to vote for the SVP is
signiﬁcantly higher, independent of other household- and
individual-level characteristics. In other words, the
inﬂuence of parental voting behaviour on young people’svoting behaviour is not due to common household char-
acteristics, as predicted by the spurious relationship
hypothesis (Tedin, 1974). Indeed, our ﬁndings do not
afﬁrm the claim that similarity in political preferences is
due to the family’s shared location in the social structure,
as we control for both the parents’ and the respondents’
social position. Parents’ educational level does not affect
their children’s SVP voting behaviour after
controlling for the children’s socioeconomic and attitu-
dinal characteristics.10
In line with our expectations, our results also indicate
that mothers are more inﬂuential than fathers, judging
from the difference in size of the coefﬁcients, although both
have an independent inﬂuence on their offspring. This
provides initial evidence for the need to disentangle the
mother’s and father’s inﬂuences on their offspring’s SVP
preference.
Turning to the control variables, we see that e as would
be expected e the young people’s negative attitudes
toward immigrants and the European Union are strongly
and positively related to a radical right party choice. Young
males are, on average, more supportive of the SVP than
young females. This corresponds with previous research
with respect to extreme right support among adults
(Givens, 2004; Gidengel et al., 2005). Speaking Italian
considerably decreases the chance that a young person
votes for the SVP. In linewithmost previous research on the
radical right (Lubbers et al., 2002; Norris, 2005), our ﬁnd-
ings show that less educated individuals are more likely to
vote for the SVP. Being enrolled in school is not associated
with SVP support, but whether one has a paid job is. All
three levels of occupational status differ signiﬁcantly from
the groupwithout an occupation: they are all more likely to
vote for the SVP. Differences between the occupational
status groups are not signiﬁcant. In contrast to previous
research (Billiet, 1995; Coffé, 2005), we do not ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant relationship between church attendance and
SVP voting.
Turning to the second model, we see that parents’
negative attitudes toward the EU have a positive effect on
their children’s preference for the SVP. Thus, those young
people whose parents hold negative attitudes toward
immigrants are more likely to vote for the SVP. No signiﬁ-
cant associations were found between parental negative
attitudes toward immigrants and the chance that a young
person will vote for the radical right. Note that the effect of
the parents’ attitudes holds even after controlling for their
children’s negative attitudes toward immigrants and the
EU.
Moving onto a model that includes both the parents’
SVP voting behaviour and radical right attitudes (Model 3),
we ﬁnd that the effect of mothers’ SVP voting on young-
sters’ SVP voting is robust. Even after controlling for
mothers’ negative attitudes toward immigrants and the EU,
mothers’ radical right voting behaviour signiﬁcantly inﬂu-
ences their offspring’s radical right party choice. The odds
Table 1
Results of multilevel logistic regression of youngsters’ SVP voting on parental background and control variables (Level 1 N¼ 2,221, Level 2 N¼ 918, Level 3
N¼ 580).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
B S.E. OR B S.E. OR B S.E. OR B S.E. OR
Parental background: SVP voting
SVP voting mother 1.887*** .413 6.603 1.734*** .420 5.665 1.022* .502 2.780
SVP voting father .642w .354 1.900 .488 .367 1.629 .534 .370 1.706
SVP voting mother * female 1.984** .768 7.275
Parental background: attitudes
Negative attitude immigrants mother .428 .271 1.534 .344 .270 1.411 .326 .271 1.385
Negative attitude immigrants father .318 .296 1.375 .196 .293 1.216 .189 .297 1.208
Negative attitude EU mother .704* .310 2.023 .532w .309 1.703 .537w .311 1.710
Negative attitude EU father .700* .345 2.014 .575w .336 1.776 .576w .339 1.779
Control variables
Education mother .091 .076 .913 .079 .084 .924 .061 .081 .941 .062 .082 .940
Education father .054 .066 .947 .051 .072 .951 .041 .069 .960 .040 .071 .961
Negative attitude immigrants 1.461*** .251 4.312 1.380*** .261 3.974 1.390*** .259 4.015 1.443*** .264 4.234
Negative attitude EU 1.766*** .294 5.846 1.600*** .309 4.955 1.549*** .306 4.706 1.564*** .313 4.780
Education .124w .074 .883 .125 .077 .883 .114 .076 .892 .114 .076 .892
In school .328 .278 .720 .318 .287 .727 .315 .287 .730 .265 .290 .767
Occupational status: lowa .843w .463 2.324 .953* .479 2.594 .837w .478 2.309 .850w .480 2.340
Occupational status: mediumb 1.268*** .345 3.555 1.304*** .360 3.685 1.261*** .357 3.527 1.236** .359 3.442
Occupational status: highc .871* .385 2.390 .853* .400 2.347 .874* .397 2.398 .821* .401 2.273
Church attendance .038 .066 1.039 .007 .069 .993 .011 .068 1.012 .002 .068 1.002
Age-18 .004 .070 .996 .028 .072 1.028 .003 .072 .997 .004 .072 .996
Female 1.380*** .310 .252 1.455*** .329 .233 1.441*** .327 .237 1.750*** .358 .174
French speakingd .633 .421 .531 .598 .464 .550 .470 .454 .625 .464 .459 .629
Italian speakingd 2.898* 1.477 .055 2.995* 1.513 .050 2.950* 1.502 .052 2.890w 1.498 .056
Intercept 5.321*** .584 6.017*** .665 5.907*** .647 5.838*** .651
Log likelihood 533.757 539.617 527.362 523.865
Variance level 2 (individual) 2.001* .787 2.215* .927 2.310** .896 2.281* .917
Variance level 3 (parents) 2.768** .934 3.798*** 1.106 3.002** .976 3.144** 1.017
Source: Swiss Household Panel Data (1999e2007).
Note: Log likelihood of model containing only control variables is 644.724.
wp< .10 *p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001.
a Low status: semi- and unskilled manual, farm labour, self-employed farm, reference group is no occupation.
b Medium status: routine non-manual, self-employed with and without employees, manual supervision, skilled manual., reference group is no
occupation.
c High status: higher controllers, low controllers, reference group is no occupation.
d Reference group is German speaking.
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SVP makes a child more than ﬁve times as likely to vote for
the SVP as well. In contrast, the weaker inﬂuence of fathers’
SVP voting behaviour on their offspring’s preference for the
radical right disappears after controlling for parental atti-
tudinal characteristics. After controlling for parental SVP
preference, the effect of parental attitudes on their
offspring’s SVP voting is limited. The previous model
showed that mothers’ and fathers’ negative attitudes
toward the EU positively and signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced
youngsters’ radical right voting behaviour, but once the
mothers’ radical right voting behaviour is included only
a modest effect of mother’s negative attitude toward the EU
remains.
Finally, let us turn to the model including interaction
terms. As described above, the aim of this model is to test
whether parental SVP voting and related attitudes differ-
entially inﬂuence SVP voting for sons and daughters.
Interactions of the child’s gender with father’s and
mother’s negative attitudes toward the EU and toward
immigrants and with father’s and mother’s SVP voting
preference were estimated in separate models. Only onesigniﬁcant interaction termwas found:mother’s SVP voting
and the gender of the child. Hence, we added only this
interaction term in our fourth model. Note that inclusion of
this interaction term changes the estimates for the
mother’s SVP voting compared to the previous models. In
the interactive model, the main effect of mother’s SVP
voting now represents the effect of mother’s SVP voting for
male respondents only. It shows that the mother’s SVP
voting has a positive effect on boys’ preference for the SVP.
The positive and signiﬁcant interaction term of mother’s
SVP voting and being female indicates that, although
women are much less likely to vote for the SVP than men,
the positive inﬂuence of a mother’s SVP voting on her
offspring’s SVP preference is signiﬁcantly stronger for girls.
In other words, young people whose mothers vote for the
SVP aremore likely to vote for the SVP, and this is especially
the case for girls.
5. Conclusion
Writing four decades ago, Jennings and Niemi (1968)
conﬁrmed the conventional wisdom about the role of
Appendix. Descriptive statistics for all variables (2221
observations from 918 respondents).
Range M SD
SVP voting 0e1 .121 .326
SVP voting mother 0e1 .072 .258
SVP voting father 0e1 .107 .309
Negative attitude immigrants mother 0e1 .273 .446
Negative attitude immigrants father 0e1 .246 .431
Negative attitude EU mother 0e1 .364 .481
Negative attitude EU father 0e1 .433 .496
Education mother 0e10 4.99 2.44
Education father 0e10 6.58 2.65
Negative attitude immigrants 0e1 .239 .427
Negative attitude EU 0e1 .455 .498
Education 0e10 3.84 2.51
In school 0e1 .655 .475
No occupation 0e1 .338 .473
Occupation, low statusa 0e1 .093 .290
Occupation, medium statusb 0e1 .350 .477
Occupation, high statusc 0e1 .220 .414
Church attendance 0e8 2.77 2.01
Age 18e25 20.80 2.18
Femaled 0e1 .480 .500
French speaking 0e1 .238 .426
Italian speaking 0e1 .025 .155
German speaking 0e1 .737 .440
Source: Swiss Household Panel Data (1999e2007).
a Low status: semi- and unskilled manual, farm labour, self-employed
farm.
b Medium status: routine non-manual, self-employed with and without
employees, manual supervision, skilled manual.
c High status: higher controllers, low controllers.
d On level of the respondent there are 422 women (45.9%) and 497 men
(54.1%).
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Our study offers strong evidence that such a socialisation
process also shapes radical right support in Switzerland
today. Young people whose parents vote for the SVP are
signiﬁcantly more likely to support the SVP. This holds
even controlling for the household socioeconomic status
and the young people’s main socioeconomic and attitu-
dinal characteristics. Hence, the inﬂuence may not be
ascribed to a possible inheritance of young people’s
structural positions from their parents. Notably, mothers’
SVP preference seems to affect their offspring’s SVP
preference.
Parental attitudes toward Switzerland joining the EU
also inﬂuence the SVP-preference of their children, but
the effect of the actual party preference of especially the
mother is stronger. Having a mother who votes for the
SVP appears to be a principal path to SVP voting for
young people, and more so for girls than for boys.
Fathers’ preference for the SVP does not matter once his
attitudes toward immigrants and the EU are controlled
for.
Our ﬁndings underline the need to differentiate the
inﬂuences of fathers’ and mothers’ radical right party
preference on their offspring’s radical right support. While
our ﬁndings conﬁrm expectations that mothers’ radical
right voting behaviour will bemore inﬂuential than fathers’
radical right voting behaviour, the exciting next step is to
further understand the reason why mothers and fathers
inﬂuence their offspring’s radical right party preference in
different ways. Scholars (Bao et al., 1999; Zuckerman et al.,
2007) tend to assume that mothers matter more than
fathers because of their higher frequency of interaction
with their children. An additional or alternative explana-
tionwith respect to radical right voting behaviour might be
that given that women seem to feel more resistance to
voting for the radical right than men, they may become
true supporters e and consequently put more effort into
‘inﬂuencing’ others e once they decide to give their vote to
the radical right. Future research might also further
investigate which family characteristics shape the extent to
which children assume the radical right preference of their
parents. In particular, children who have been raised in
a family with connections to radical right organisations
might be more inﬂuenced by their parents’ radical right
party choice.
Combining the socialisation research with the research
on SVP, we trust to have shown that this stream of
research cannot be neglected if we want to gain a fuller
understanding of the path to SVP voting and more
generally radical right voting. Indeed, since the SVP shares
with other radical right parties an image that is heavily
implanted with the immigration and asylum issue and
considered as a radical right party among most radical
right scholars (see e.g. Mudde, 2007; Husbands, 2000;
Betz, 2001; Betz and Johnson, 2004) we believe to have
added with our study to the understanding of the success
of radical right parties. However, it would be interesting to
compare the case of the SVP with other radical right
parties to investigate in an empirical way to what extent
our ﬁndings hold for radical right parties in different
political systems.References
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